Greg Detre
@8.30 on 19/10/01
Prof. Colin Blakemore
life, intelligence, consciousness � stages of evolution
the problem with objectivising consciousness � the mechanism by which we analyse it is itself subjective and part of the problem
Searle: consciousness = simply everything about our lives
importance of having intentions
subjectivity has + can have no function
but it is underpinned by a neural, functional representation of the world �/span> structure of language
the subjective adds nothing in informational terms � it�s causally intert � epiphenomenon
subjectivity = a product of neural states
no 2 identical states can fail to give rise to the same mental state
�(perhaps vice versa is different though)
would similarly complex functional arrangements give rise to subjectiveness?
the neurons, their arrangement or the neural state
the �hard problem� is where the subjectivity comes from � what is it about?
could this reduced subjective representation be adaptive? like an executive
Penrose�s quantum mechanics add free-will-dependent-upon-subjectivity
Blakemore is eliminating downward causation (brain � mind)
subjectivity adds a dimension to our reward system
there must be a neural state underpinning the representation of a homuncular self
Damasio: piles of cards with penalty/prizes in imaginary dollars
one pile: big prizes, mainly losses, like gambling
other pile: lots of little wins
frontal lobe damage go for the big win: explain that they can�t resist
whereas normal subjects adopt a successful strategy, though they are unable to articulate it till long after
subjective account = merely a post-narrative
the subjective state arises after the non-conscious decision (see Dennett and the red-green ball)
report decisions relative to a rapidly sweeping second hand
subjectivity = secondary inert meta-form of representation
(just like the metaphorical computer Recycle Bin = a downward causal representation)
what�s it all for? language
Goodale + Milner � upper vs lower parts damage
their linguistic expressive system recognises the object � ventral
the hands know, but they can�t articulate the discrimination
�= motor vs object recognition
emergent property of the brain state �/span> subjectivity
water molecules don�t change, yet the ice is suddenly solid
how can we identify mental + neural � chalk + cheese
social intelligence being the substrate, rather than language
irony that psychology and physiology may arm the Animal Rights cause
we perceive self + intention because they fit the syntax of language
can we not use an overly-hard problem which tests criteria necessary and beyond what we�re testing, e.g. the Turing test???
what�s new about Blakemore vs Dennett, Davidson??? and the epiphenomenalist???
Blakemore isn�t much like Dennett, in that he�s not trying to quine qualia. and Davidson is struggling against criticisms that anomalous monism is mental inert whereas Blakemore embraces it
what determined how our mental represntation is formed from the neural state???
how far down the phylogenetic tree is consciousness??? are there levels of consciousness???
what biological/evolutionary reason prompted the evolution of consciousness???
totally (physically) determinist � is that problem???
the causal inertness of the mental deprives us of free (in the sense of unpredictable) behaviour � no, that�s wrong. we can still be unpredictable�
Blakemore � yes, but they�re so richly determined that only God knows them, so it�s not a problem
does Blakemore believe in zombies???
how could the mental be anything but inert without some sort of non-deterministic means of downward causation being visible in neurochemical activity???
but would such downward causation be visible there, in the neurochemical activity though???
Nick K � your chatterbot doesn�t need consciousness in order to linguistically understand hunger � you need body inputs
why is it so difficult to explain things in language if it�s so tied to our subjectivity???
does the water/ice example help???
yes, it�s the difference between subjectivity being an epiphenomena or identical(???)
yes, mental = causally inert epiphenomenon (e.g. Maggie appears to be driving the car), but then the mind-body problem becomes on of where does this mentality come from??? would a computer model of the brain be conscious???
surely though the water/ice structurally changes, which amounts to a change in the substrate (even though obviously the atoms, and apparently molecules too, remain the same)
epiphenomenalism vs identity theory vs emergence???
can we have thought without language???
why is our subjectivity a non-linguistic representation???